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MAGNA CARTA IN NORTH CAROLINA* 
JOHN V. ORTH 
The past is never dead. It’s not even past. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is characteristic of the Anglo-American legal tradition that it 
locates the Golden Age not in the future but in the past. In 1100, King 
Henry I promised in his coronation charter to restore the good 
customs as they were in the days of King Edward the Confessor, 
before the Norman Conquest.2 In 1215 Henry II’s son, King John, 
acting under duress, sealed Magna Carta, restoring ancient liberties.3 
Three centuries later, Sir Edward Coke combated the absolutist 
claims of King James I with appeals to ancient learning found in old 
books, things whereof the memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary, and gave particular prominence to the rediscovered—in fact 
reinvented—Magna Carta.4 In the eighteenth century, Americans saw 
themselves reenacting Coke’s challenge to Stuart absolutism as they 
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 1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 119 (1951).  
 2. Coronation Charter of Henry I, translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, 379 app. A (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al. eds., 2014); see JUDITH A. GREEN, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND UNDER HENRY I, at 98 (1986). 
 3. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 172 (2d ed. 1898) (“On the whole, 
the charter contains little that is absolutely new. It is restorative.”). 
 4. See MAURICE ASHLEY, MAGNA CARTA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 10–13 
(1965); HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ENGLISHMAN AND HIS HISTORY 55 (Ernest 
Barker ed., 1945). 
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defied King George III.5 After Independence, Thomas Jefferson 
proposed to base the laws of Virginia on English common law as it 
was before the “oldest statutes extant,” that is, even before Magna 
Carta.6 But, of course, it was never possible to go back to the “good 
old days” of Anglo-Saxon England or to the ancient constitution of 
Sir Edward Coke. Nor did anyone really want to. It was an idealized 
past, a past that never was that they wanted to revivify or, rather, 
vivify. A tradition that claims to be ruled by the past cannot rest 
content with the past as it was. The past must somehow be made to do 
the work of the present. 
The tension between the past as past and an imagined past that is 
used to justify a desired present inevitably creates tensions between 
historians committed to the Rankean ideal of telling it wie es 
eigentlich gewesen, as it really was,7 and the assorted reformers, 
revolutionaries, and legal theorists who claim to want to turn back the 
clock. This tension was evident from the beginning. Tories and 
royalists dismissed Magna Carta as a feudal irrelevance: the 
seventeenth-century scholar Robert Brady was a better historian than 
Coke.8 But who ever heard of Robert Brady? 
It is now a commonplace that there are two Magna Cartas, the 
medieval “big charter”—big as opposed to the little Carta de 
Foresta9—and the reimagined Great Charter of Liberties of Sir 
Edward Coke.10 In fact, there is at least one more: the Magna Carta 
that Americans gleaned from the pages of Blackstone’s 
 
 5. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, 
HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–47 (1992); David N. 
Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 131, 174–96 (1992). 
 6. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William Peden 
ed., 1955) (1785).  
 7. Leopold von Ranke, Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 
1494–1514, in THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY: FROM VOLTAIRE TO THE PRESENT 55, 57 
(Fritz Stern ed., 1956). 
 8. See HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, MAGNA CARTA IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 23 (1969) (“Brady	.	.	.	stands for the principle 
with which we are so familiar at the present day—namely, that a document like the 
Charter has to be interpreted according to the form and structure of the society in which it 
had its origin.”); see also J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 36 (George Garnett & John Hudson 
eds., 3d ed. 2015); J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL 
LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
182–228 (1967). 
 9. See W. L. WARREN, KING JOHN 237 n. (1961). 
 10. Wm. S. McKechnie, Magna Carta (1215–1915), in MAGNA CARTA 
COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 1, 12 (Henry Elliott Malden ed., 1917). 
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Commentaries.11 Even the most ardent defenders of England’s 
chartered liberties recognized that many, even most, of the chapters 
of Magna Carta were ancient history in the negative sense, irrelevant 
centuries later. The feudal incident of relief upon inheritance, limited 
by chapters two and three (1215),12 went out with the Statute of 
Tenures (1660).13 And the grasping kinsmen of Gerard de Athyes, 
deprived of their offices by chapter fifty (1215),14 became food for 
worms long ago. 
I.  MAGNA CARTA IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
But a handful of the chapters from the original could still be put 
to use in the present—most obviously, the famous legem terrae or law 
of the land clause, chapter thirty-nine of the original, chapter twenty-
nine of the 1225 edition and subsequent codification.15 Determined to 
consolidate their victory over tyranny, many American 
revolutionaries promptly incorporated this clause in their state 
constitutions.16 In the North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776, 
an edited version modeled on the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
drafted earlier that year17 appears in section twelve: “[N]o freeman 
ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, 
or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or 
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”18 
Carried forward in the state’s 1868 constitution19 and again in the 
1971 revision,20 it is now often thought of as North Carolina’s version 
 
 11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127–28. G. Alan Tarr refers to the 
three “faces” of Magna Carta: “an historical face, a legal face, and a symbolic face.” G. 
Alan Tarr, American State Constitutions and the Three Faces of Magna Carta, in MAGNA 
CARTA: MUSE AND MENTOR 122, 122 (Randy J. Holland ed., 2014). 
 12. MAGNA CARTA chs. 2, 3 (1215), reprinted and translated in DAVID CARPENTER, 
MAGNA CARTA 38–39 (2015). 
 13. 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (1660). 
 14. MAGNA CARTA ch. 50 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 
12, at 56–57. 
 15. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 
12, at 52–53; MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE 
OF LAW, supra note 2, at 429. 
 16. E.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, §	21. 
 17. Id. 
 18. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, §	12. 
 19. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §	17. The 1868 Constitution carried forward the 
provision in the 1776 Constitution verbatim, renumbering the section and relabeling the 
Declaration of Rights as Article I. 
 20. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	19 (substituting “shall” for “ought”). The mandatory nature 
of the provisions of the original Declaration of Rights had long been recognized. See, e.g., 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (2016) 
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of the Federal Due Process Clause,21 although in fact it would be 
more accurate to think of the Federal Due Process Clause22—also 
derived from the same chapter of Magna Carta by way of a Law 
French translation23—as the federal version of North Carolina’s law 
of the land clause. 
Although the law of the land clause was the only bit of Magna 
Carta copied more or less directly into the state’s first constitution, 
the North Carolina drafters undoubtedly thought they had 
incorporated much more. Habeas corpus and trial by jury were then 
often fathered on Magna Carta.24 And years later, when knowledge of 
the 1215 original revealed what had dropped out of the reissues, the 
source of the ban on taxation without representation was located in 
 
Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 590, 598 (1825) (“[T]he word ought, in this and 
other sections of the [Constitution,] should be understood imperatively. It is sufficient for 
the creature to know the will of the creator. Obedience is then a duty, without an express 
command.”). For a brief discussion of the insignificance of the changed wording, see John 
V. Orth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205–06 (1993) (reviewing TOWARD A USABLE PAST: 
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 
1991)). Also in 1971, an additional sentence guaranteeing equal protection of the laws was 
added. N.C. CONST. art I, §	19; see JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH 
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 2013). 
 21. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 254 N.C. 301, 303, 118 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1961); Nat’l Sur. 
Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N.C. 98, 103, 59 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1950); Yancey v. N.C. State Highway 
& Pub. Works Comm’n, 222 N.C. 106, 108, 22 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1942); Johnston v. State, 
224 N.C. App. 282, 296, 735 S.E.2d 859, 870 (2012), aff’d per curiam, 367 N.C. 164, 749 
S.E.2d 278 (2013).  
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be	.	.	.	deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law	.	.	.	.”). 
 23. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59–63 (7th ed. 
1956). 
 24. As to habeas corpus, see, for example, In re Bryan, 60 N.C. (Win.) 1, 15 (1863) 
(citing “our Constitution and Bill of Rights, in which is reiterated the great principle of 
Magna Carta, ‘every free man restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire 
into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and such remedy ought 
not to be denied or delayed’	”); Report of the Commissioners Appointed by an Act of the 
Legislature of 1817, To Revise the Laws of North-Carolina, in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
NORTH-CAROLINA, at iii, v (Henry Potter ed., 1821) (“[T]he immunity of the subject from 
unjust imprisonment is proclaimed by magna charta	.	.	.	.”). As to trial by jury, see, for 
example, Resolutions Adopted by the Provincial Congress of North Carolina (Aug. 27, 
1774), in 9 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1043, 1045 (William L. 
Saunders ed., 1890) (“Resolved, That trial by Juries of the vicinity is the only lawful 
inquest that can pass upon the life of a British subject and that it is a right handed down to 
us from the earliest stages confirmed and sanctified by Magna Charta itself that no 
freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or dispossessed of his free tenement and Liberties 
or outlawed or banished or otherwise hurt or injured unless by the legal judgment of his 
peers or by the law of the Land, and therefore all who suffer otherwise are not victims to 
public justice but fall a sacrifice to the powers of Tyranny and highhanded oppression.”). 
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the lost chapters twelve and fourteen.25 But the exact ancestry of the 
rights declared in the state’s first constitution was really beside the 
point. The drafters took Coke at his word that Magna Carta was “for 
the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental 
laws of England.”26 Common law reception, beginning with a colonial 
statute in 1715 and repeated after Independence with a state statute 
in 1778, made further copying unnecessary.27 
For sixty years after Independence, North Carolina lawyers 
worried fitfully about whether any of the lesser chapters of Magna 
Carta were included among the English statutes still in force in the 
state. Francois-Xavier Martin in his Collection of the Statutes of the 
Parliament of England in Force in the State of North-Carolina, 
published in 1792 in accordance with “a resolve of the General 
Assembly,” included two such lesser chapters: the chapter concerning 
the security of foreign merchants and the chapter limiting appeals of 
death by a woman.28 But Henry Potter’s revisal in 1821 did not 
 
 25. See JOHN MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF BLACKSTONE 27 
(1899) (listing under “Rights of Private Property, Protections Afforded, Magna Charta”: 
“No taxes are to be imposed without the consent of the people or their representatives”); 
SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES: A TREATISE, FROM A NORTH CAROLINA 
STANDPOINT, ON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND BOOKS OF THE 
COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE WHICH HAVE NOT BECOME OBSOLETE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1916) (“[Magna Carta] is said to be the forerunner of the 
control of the purse strings by parliament.”). But see A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA 
CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 11 (rev. ed. 1998) (“This puts the argument for the 
significance of chapters 12 and 14 in too strong and too modern a form. Nevertheless, it is 
not hard to see that in the notion that at least some kinds of exactions could not be had 
without consent there lay a ready example for those who in later ages sought ancient 
precedents for the claim of the right of a people to be taxed only with their consent.”). 
 26. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *127–28 (citing EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *proem). 
 27. Act of 1778, ch. 5, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
162 (Walter Clark ed., 1905); Act of 1715, ch. 31, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF 
NORTH CAROLINA 38 (Walter Clark ed., 1905). An Act of 1749 had adopted seven 
chapters from the 1225 codification of Magna Carta, including the all-important chapter 
twenty-nine. Act of 1749, ch. 1, reprinted in 23 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 317 (Walter Clark ed., 1905). Although included in Swann’s Revisal, it 
disappeared from later collections. See A COLLECTION OF ALL THE PUBLIC ACTS OF 
ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: NOW IN FORCE AND USE 293–94 
(Samuel Swann ed., James Davis 1751); JAMES IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
NORTH-CAROLINA 127 n.a (Edenton, N.C., Hodge & Wills 1791) (noting that the Act of 
1749 is “universally acknowledged to have been repealed or disallowed by the King in 
Council”). It was traditionally believed that it was disallowed “upon the ground that it was 
too sweeping in its repeal of British statutes.” MORDECAI, supra note 25, at 6–7.  
 28. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE 
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 1 (Newbern, 
N.C., Editor’s Press 1792). Compare MAGNA CARTA chs. 30, 34 (1225), translated in 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (2016) 
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include either of these (or any other) chapters of Magna Carta.29 Only 
in 1838 was the problem definitively resolved. The Revised Statutes, 
enacted by the general assembly and published in that year, repealed 
whatever English statutes were still in force, with certain exceptions.30  
When authorizing the preparation of the Revised Statutes, the 
general assembly directed the superintendents, James Iredell and 
William Battle, to include certain historical documents as well: “the 
second charter of Charles the Second to the lords proprietors of this 
State, the great deed of grant from the lords proprietors, the grant 
from George the Second to the Earl of Granville”—essentially the 
title deeds to the state—and “such other acts, now in force, and not 
repealed by this act, as the superintendents may in their discretion 
think proper.”31 Interpreting their mandate broadly, Iredell and 
Battle included both the “Magna Carta of King John” and the 
“Magna Carta of Edward I.”32 And for good measure, they added the 
Petition of Rights (reaffirming relevant parts of Magna Carta) and 
other similar documents.33 The immediate source may have been an 
identical collection in South Carolina’s revisal of a year earlier;34 in 
both, King John’s Magna Carta is divided into seventy-nine chapters, 
rather than the now familiar sixty-three35—incidentally making the 
citation of Magna Carta, already confused by the multiple reissues, 
even more complicated.36 The South Carolinians credited Sir William 
 
MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 430, with MAGNA CARTA chs. 
41, 54 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 52–53, 58–59. 
 29. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 85–93. Although 
the general assembly charged Henry Potter, J. L. Taylor, and Bart. Yancey with preparing 
the revisal, Potter was the one who supervised the publication and whose name is attached 
to the revisal in the official statutory history in the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. 
 30. See 1 N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §	2 (1837). 
 31. Id. §	10. Frederick Nash had been authorized by the general assembly, along with 
Iredell and Battle, to prepare the revised statutes, but only Iredell and Battle supervised 
the publication, which is referred to in the official statutory history in the North Carolina 
General Statutes as Revised Statutes. Id. 
 32. 2 N.C. REV. STAT. 480–500 (1837). 
 33. Id. at 501–09. The copy of the Revised Statutes in the collection of Martin 
Brinkley, Dean of the University of North Carolina School of Law, is inscribed with 
marginalia by Thomas Ruffin. 
 34. 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 72–77 (Thomas Cooper ed., 
Columbia, S.C., A. S. Johnston 1836). 
 35. Compare 2 N.C. REV. STAT. 480–92 (1837), and 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 34, at 75–77, with MAGNA CARTA chs. 1–63 (1215), 
reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 36–69. 
 36. E.g., Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 184 N.C. 609, 610, 113 S.E. 506, 507 (1922) 
(citing “chapter 47” on the prompt administration of justice). In the conventional division 
of Magna Carta of 1215 this chapter would be numbered forty, but in the 1225 reissue it 
would be chapter twenty-nine. Compare MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (2016) 
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Blackstone’s Law Tracts for the Latin text—included in the South 
Carolina, but not the North Carolina compilation—and the English 
translation of Magna Carta by Nicolas Tindal and Tobias Smollett in 
Paul Rapin de Thoyras’s Histoire d’Angleterre.37 
The renewed interest that Carolinians showed in the historical 
documents may have been more than mere scholarly zeal; it came at a 
time of growing sectional conflict. Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia 
in 1831 had given new urgency to the national debate about slavery.38 
The union had barely survived the South Carolina Nullification Crisis 
the following year.39 And the abolitionist campaign had begun to 
rattle North Carolinian nerves.40 Governor David Swain used his 1835 
address to the general assembly to denounce the recent “spirit of 
fanaticism.”41 Southerners may have looked to Magna Carta’s 
centuries-old guarantee of free men’s property to defend slavery—the 
region’s “peculiar institution.”42 Eventually, Chief Justice Roger 
Taney would hold in the notorious Dred Scott case43 that the federal 
 
translated in CARPENTER, supra note 12, at 52–53, with MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225), 
translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 2, at 429. 
 37. 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 34, at 73 (“The 
Charter of King John, I have taken from Blackstone’s Law-tracts, compared with the 
edition in the Stat. of the Realm. The translation I have adopted from Rapin’s Hist. of 
England.”); see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, LAW TRACTS 15–37 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 
1762); 1 RAPIN DE THOYRAS, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 261 (N. Tindal & T. Smollett eds. & 
trans., London, John Harrison 1789) (1724) (citing the Cotton Library as the source of the 
Latin text). The copy of Blackstone’s Law Tracts in the collection of the Kathrine R. 
Everett Law Library of the University of North Carolina is inscribed by William Hooper, 
a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and dated in 1765 in Hooper’s handwriting. 
 38. See generally NAT TURNER 1–12 (Eric Foner ed., 1971) (analyzing contemporary 
understandings and historical accounts of Nat Turner’s slave rebellion). 
 39. See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE 
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1816–1836, at ix–3 (1965) 
(providing an in-depth chronicle of events and discussion of the crisis of 1832–1833). 
 40. See LACY K. FORD, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE 
OLD SOUTH 494 (2009). 
 41. DAVID L. SWAIN, MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, TO THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SESSION, 
NOVEMBER 16, 1835, at 6 (1835); see FORD, supra note 40, at 494. 
 42. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH (Vintage Books ed. 1956). The only other state to include Magna Carta 
in its statute books during the antebellum period was Georgia in 1845. Northern states 
followed after the Civil War. For a complete list of states that included Magna Carta in 
their statute books, see Joyce Lee Malcolm, Magna Carta in America: Entrenched, in 
MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM 1215–2015, at 120, 132 (Nicholas 
Vincent ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 43. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (2016) 
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guarantee of due process protected a slave owner’s property—a 
precocious example of substantive due process.44 
After the Civil War, North Carolina caught up with other states 
and included in the Reconstruction Constitution of 1868 a clause 
inspired by another chapter of Magna Carta: the open courts clause. 
This clause, elaborated from chapter forty (1215),45 chapter twenty of 
the 1225 edition46 and subsequent codification, provided the 
following: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury 
done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, 
denial, or delay.”47 
From early days, North Carolina judges cited chapters of Magna 
Carta but not always the obvious ones. In a 1795 case concerning the 
nice point of whether a bond sealed but not subscribed by the 
witnesses could be declared upon in an action of debt or whether only 
covenant lay, Judge Haywood noted that archbishops, bishops, and 
barons attested Magna Carta by their seals, not by their signatures.48 
Other unusual cases sometimes reminded learned jurists of obsolete 
chapters of Magna Carta. For instance, the case of a guardian who 
permitted his underage female ward to marry the guardian’s 
impecunious son led Justice Gaston to mention the nondisparagement 
chapter.49 A claim of an exclusive right to fish in navigable waters 
reminded Chief Justice Ruffin of the chapter concerning fish weirs.50 
A bequest to Davidson College that would have caused the college’s 
assets to exceed the maximum allowed by its charter reminded Chief 
Justice Nash of the mortmain chapter in the reissue of 1225.51 And a 
personal injury action brought by an Austro-Hungarian father on 
behalf of his minor son, which was caught up in the outbreak of 
 
 44. Id. at 450 (“[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a 
particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the 
laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”). 
 45. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 
12, at 52–53. 
 46. MAGNA CARTA ch. 20 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 2, at 428. 
 47. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §	35; see N.C. CONST. art. I, §	18. 
 48. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 193, 204 (Super. Ct. 1795). 
 49. Shutt v. Carloss, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 232, 240 (1838) (referring to MAGNA 
CARTA ch. 6 (1215)). 
 50. Collins v. Benbury, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 118, 126 (1844) (referring to MAGNA CARTA 
ch. 33 (1215)). 
 51. Trs. of Davidson Coll. v. Ex rel. Chambers, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 253, 278 (1857) 
(Nash, C.J., dissenting) (citing 9 Hen. 3, c. 36 (1225)). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (2016) 
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World War I, recalled “the enlightened and humane provision of 
Magna Charta, c. 30 [1225]” on the subject of foreign merchants in 
time of war.52 Judicial discussions of dower53 were often ornamented 
with references to the relevant chapters of Magna Carta, including the 
right of quarantine, the dowager’s right to occupy the mansion house 
for forty days after her husband’s decease.54 
II.  WALTER CLARK AND MAGNA CARTA 
A flurry of citations to Magna Carta is also associated with the 
tenure of Walter Clark, who served on the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina from 1889 to 1924, the last twenty-one years of which he 
served as Chief Justice.55 Clark’s changing attitude toward the charter 
exemplifies the tension that developed as historicist and legalist 
approaches to Magna Carta diverged in the early twentieth century.56 
In a 1905 personal injury action against a railroad, he repeated the 
traditional view that “[t]he guaranty of the right of trial by jury is 
traced back with pride to the words of Magna Charta, ‘Legale 
judicium parium suorum.’	”57 At this time, Clark was repeating 
common legal lore in North Carolina.58 Judges before Clark routinely 
described the constitutional right to trial by jury as a “fundamental 
principle of the common law, declared in ‘Magna Charta.’	”59 In fact, 
 
 52. Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N.C. 435, 439, 95 S.E. 851, 853 (1918) 
(referring to MAGNA CARTA ch. 30 (1225)). 
 53. Dower was available to surviving spouses until 1959. See Act of June 10, 1959, ch. 
879, §	1, N.C. Sess. Laws 886, 886 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	29-4 (2015)) (“The 
estates of curtesy and dower are hereby abolished.”). 
 54. E.g., In re Gorham, 177 N.C. 271, 277, 98 S.E. 717, 720 (1919); Fishel v. Browning, 
145 N.C. 71, 75, 58 S.E. 759, 760 (1907); Sutton v. Askew, 66 N.C. 172, 181–82 (1872); 
Griffin v. Simpson, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 126, 127 (1850); Spencer v. Weston, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. 
& Bat.) 213, 214–15 (1835). 
 55. NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585–1979: A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL 
HISTORY 575–76 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1981). 
 56. See, e.g., Walter Clark, Some Myths of the Law, 13 MICH. L. REV. 26, 28–30 (1914) 
(describing the “myth” of Magna Carta and explaining that it has been incorrectly used 
and interpreted by some courts); Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 
260, 261–62 (1905) (arguing that “Magna Carta was not (a) the work of the ‘nation’ or the 
‘people’ in any reasonable sense of the term, nor (b) a landmark in constitutional progress, 
but (c) a positive nuisance and stumbling-block to the generation which came after it”). 
 57. Kearns v. S. Ry. Co., 139 N.C. 470, 482, 52 S.E. 131, 136 (1905) (Clark, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215)). 
 58. See Resolutions Adopted by the Provincial Congress of North Carolina (Aug. 27, 
1774), supra note 24, at 1045.  
 59. State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883); see also State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749, 751 
(1884) (“The people of the American Union, and especially the people of this state, have, 
ever since their existence as a people, regarded and treated this provision in their organic 
law as an essential feature in free government and as one of the fundamental bulwarks of 
their civil and political liberty.”). 
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the independence of the jury in North Carolina was guaranteed to an 
extent that would have struck English judges as extreme. Trial judges 
could make no comment concerning the probable guilt of the 
defendant or the credibility of witnesses.60 As Justice Bynum stated in 
an 1876 opinion, “The jury must not only unanimously concur in the 
verdict, but must be left free to act according to the dictates of their 
own judgment.”61 So sacrosanct was the jury’s freedom of action that 
it was reversible error for a trial judge to say that two opposing 
witnesses were both “gentlemen.”62 The jury had to be free to decide 
without comment that one (or both) was not.63 
After 1905, Clark’s attitude toward Magna Carta and jury trial 
underwent a dramatic reversal. William Sharp McKechnie’s 
Commentary on the Great Charter of King John appeared that year,64 
and Clark was an early and avid reader.65 By the 1906 term of court, 
Clark revealed his new attitude: “[W]e know,” he said, “that the 
words ‘judicium parium suorum’ in Magna Charta, c. 39 [1215], did 
not either create or guaranty the right of trial by jury (as at one time 
was erroneously thought)”—including, although he did not mention 
it, by Walter Clark.66 For authority, he cited “McKechnie, Magna 
Charta, 452.”67 Later, in the 1913 case of State v. Rodgers,68 Clark 
penned the most complete statement of his new understanding of the 
great charter: “There have been law writers and judges who have 
 
 60. Act of 1796, ch. 452, §	1, reprinted in 1 N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 1, §	136 (1837) (codified 
as amended in N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-1232 (2015)), prohibited judges from commenting on 
evidence, but it had been held to be merely an “affirmance of the Constitution, Art. I secs. 
13–17, and the well-settled principles of the common law as set forth in Magna Charta.” State 
v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275, 276 (1876). As Justice Douglas later observed, the construction placed 
on the statute “goes beyond the words of the act, but it is accepted as a proper one.” State v. 
Howard, 129 N.C. 584, 674–75, 40 S.E. 71, 80 (1901) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting State 
v. Jones, 67 N.C. 285, 287 (1872)). 
 61. Dixon, 75 N.C. at 276. 
 62. MacRae v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. 289, 289–91 (1876). 
 63. Id. 
 64. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT 
CHARTER OF KING JOHN (1905). McKechnie’s book reached North Carolina lawyers 
quickly. The copy in the collection of the Kathrine R. Everett Law Library of the University 
of North Carolina is inscribed by L. P. McGehee and dated June 1905. At the time McGehee 
was a newly hired law professor. He later served as dean of the University of North Carolina 
School of Law (1910–1923). History, UNC SCH. L., http://www.law.unc.edu/about/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3P6-CAK4]. 
 65. See Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 219, 238, 51 S.E. 992, 999 (1905) (Clark, C.J.) 
(citing William Sharp McKechnie as “[t]he latest commentator on Magna Charta”). 
 66. Williams v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 140 N.C. 623, 626, 53 S.E. 448, 450 (1906), 
overruled in part by Currie & McQueen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 156 N.C. 419, 425–26, 
72 S.E. 488, 490 (1911). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 162 N.C. 656, 78 S.E. 293 (1913). 
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stated that Magna Carta, c. 39[, no longer Magna Charta in his 
parlance,] guaranteed the right of trial by jury; but this view 
originated at a time when historical statements were received with 
less investigation than at present.”69 “The words therein ‘judicium 
suorum parium,’	” Clark now insisted, “had no reference to a trial by 
jury,” again citing McKechnie (and adding Pollock and Maitland’s 
The History of English Law for good measure).70 According to Clark, 
the barons were not, in fact, demanding a general benefit but a 
“special privilege” for themselves: “[W]hen the King had any charge 
against one of their order he should not send his judges against them, 
but the charge must be tried by men of their own order, i.e., by 
barons.”71 Magna Carta and other similar charters now interested 
Clark only as “historical documents of a stage far below ours in the 
development of human rights.”72 The following year in the Michigan 
Law Review, he listed then common understandings of Magna Carta 
among the “myths of the law.”73 
With characteristic feistiness, Clark—called by his biographer the 
“fighting judge”74—continued to propagate the truth about “that 
much misunderstood instrument, the Magna Carta of John.”75 No 
longer idealized as the product of heroic barons, “sword in hand,” 
defending English liberty against a tyrannical ruler,76 it now appeared 
to Clark as merely a sordid deal between “brutal barons” and a 
“contemptible king.”77 “[T]rial by jury was not provided for in Magna 
Carta,” he flatly declared; in fact, he insisted, “at that time there were 
neither juries nor lawyers in England.”78 Of course, the discontinuity 
Clark perceived affected only the historian, not the jurist. He 
remained as committed as ever to the right to trial by jury in North 
Carolina, still understood as an independent panel of twelve acting 
only by unanimity, but he no longer proudly traced the right back to 
 
 69. Id. at 662, 78 S.E. at 295 (Clark, C.J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. (citing MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 158, 456, 457; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 
supra note 3, at 392, 581). 
 71. Id. at 663, 78 S.E. at 295. 
 72. Id. at 663, 78 S.E. at 296. 
 73. Clark, supra note 56, at 28. 
 74. See AUBREY LEE BROOKS, WALTER CLARK, FIGHTING JUDGE 81–84 (1944). 
 75. Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. 537, 540, 95 S.E. 919, 920 (1918) (Clark, C.J., 
concurring). 
 76. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *127; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 534 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1966). 
 77. Jordan, 175 N.C. at 540, 95 S.E. at 920. 
 78. In re Stone, 176 N.C. 336, 348, 97 S.E. 216, 222 (1918). 
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the thirteenth century. Magna Carta, he observed, was not law in 
North Carolina anyway.79 
Clark’s judicial utterances on the subject punctuated his chief 
justiceship, culminating in an American Law Review article he 
published in 1924, the year of his death.80 “The object of this article,” 
he wrote with the zeal of a convert, 
is in the interest of truth to show that broad as are the 
provisions of Magna Carta and great as has been its effect upon 
the course of history, it has no claim however to be styled, as it 
often has been, the origin and guarantee of trial by jury with 
which it had nothing whatever to do.81 
For leading lawyers astray, Clark blamed Coke and Blackstone, 
particularly the latter.82 The greater part of the Commentaries, he 
said, was “obsolete learning,” with “[m]uch of it [] incorrect at the 
time it was written.”83 Regarding the persistence of the fallacy 
concerning the jury, Clark attributed it to “a not unnatural tendency 
of a later generation of lawyers to explain what was unfamiliar in the 
great Charter by the surroundings of their own day.”84 
But Clark’s campaign in the interest of truth did not succeed. 
Once his commanding presence was removed from the court, the 
justices quickly began to repair the rupture created by his revisionist 
history. Clark’s bier had barely been removed from the capitol when 
in 1925 Justice Clarkson, newly appointed to the court, quoted from 
an 1883 opinion that predated Clark’s tenure: “It is a fundamental 
principle of the common law, declared in ‘Magna Charta,’ [the h has 
returned to the title,] and again in our Bill of Rights, that ‘no person 
shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury 
 
 79. See State v. Rogers, 162 N.C. 656, 663, 78 S.E. 293, 296 (1913) (Clark, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Magna Carta and other similar contracts between [the king and the 
barons]	.	.	.	confer no rights upon us, still less do they restrict our right to self-government. 
We base our right to [trial by jury], not upon the grant of any King, but upon the inherent 
power to govern ourselves	.	.	.	.”). 
 80. Walter Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, 58 AM. L. REV. 24 (1924). 
 81. Id. at 24. 
 82. For Clark’s unfavorable review of the influence of Coke and Blackstone, see 
Walter Clark, Coke, Blackstone, and the Common Law, 24 LAW. MAG. 5, 15 (1918). 
Clark’s complaint that “the influence of Blackstone and Coke has had a very narrowing 
effect upon our Profession” elicited a spirited response from Samuel Fox Mordecai, Dean 
of Trinity (now Duke) Law School. S.F. MORDECAI, MORDECAI’S MISCELLANIES 3 
(1927). 
 83. Clark, supra note 80, at 37 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*60). 
 84. Id. at 31. 
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of good and lawful men in open court.’	”85 In 1937 Clarkson joined 
issue with Clark (and McKechnie) on the Latin key words: 
In Magna Charta the basic principle of [the right to trial by 
jury] is more than once insisted on, as the great bulwark of 
English liberties, but especially by the provision that	“no 
freeman shall be hurt, in either his person or property (nisi per 
legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae), unless by 
lawful judgment of his peers or equals, or by the law of the 
land	.	.	.	.”86  
By 1944, Justice Seawell would assert, despite Walter Clark’s best 
efforts, that “most writers” regard “Magna Charta” as “guaranteeing 
trial by jury.”87 And in 1971, Justice Sharp wrote that the right to a 
trial by jury was a “fundamental principle of the common law, 
declared in Magna Charta and incorporated in our Declaration of 
Rights.”88 This view has persisted into the twenty-first century. In 
2007 Justice Brady repeated that “[s]o fundamental to the 
jurisprudence of the Anglosphere is the right to a trial by jury that it 
is set forth in the	Magna	Carta	.	.	.	.”89 
III.  MAGNA CARTA IN NORTH CAROLINA TODAY 
Whatever the precise relationship between legem terrae and trial 
by jury, the guarantee of the law of the land has been more fertile for 
state constitutional law than any other clause. Before the progressive 
incorporation of the Federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,90 the law of the land was the 
 
 85. State v. Berry, 190 N.C. 363, 363, 130 S.E. 12, 12 (1925) (Clarkson, J.) (quoting 
State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883)). A few years later, Clarkson quoted Justice 
Joseph Story: 
In Magna Carta the basic principle of [the right to trial by jury] is more than once 
insisted on, as the great bulwark of English liberties, but especially by the 
provision that “no freeman shall be hurt, in either his person or property, unless by 
lawful judgment of his peers or equals, or by the law of the land.” 
State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 578, 146 S.E. 395, 403 (1929) (Clarkson, J.) (quoting 16 
RULING CASE LAW §	3, at 182 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1917)). 
 86. Oliver v. City of Raleigh, 212 N.C. 465, 470, 193 S.E. 853, 856 (1937) (Clarkson, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 16 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 85, §	3, at 182). 
 87. State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 595, 31 S.E.2d 858, 868 (1944) (Seawell, J., 
dissenting). 
 88. State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 79, 185 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1971) (Sharp, J.) (citing 
State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883)). 
 89. State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 307, 643 S.E.2d 909, 914 (2007) (Brady, J., 
concurring). 
 90. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment Assistance of Counsel Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
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focus for judicial thinking about fundamental fairness.91 Magna Carta 
gave it a distinguished provenance. Even before the addition of the 
open courts clause to the Constitution in 1868, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, citing Magna Carta, found the right to a remedy 
implied in the law of the land.92 Despite the fact that the state 
constitution has no takings clause, the court in 1892 located the 
protection against uncompensated takings in the law of the land, 
again citing Magna Carta.93 And the guarantee against double 
jeopardy, also lacking specific mention in the state constitution, was 
found in 1907 in “the fundamental principles of the common law” and 
“Magna Charta.”94 
After incorporation made most of the Federal Bill of Rights 
enforceable against the states, the law of the land clause became 
relatively less important. But, the state supreme court continued to 
insist on it as an independent basis for decision, a legacy of the once 
lively project of expansive readings of state constitutions.95 In 1971, 
two years after the United States Supreme Court incorporated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment,96 the state supreme court insisted that the decision 
“added nothing to our law,” which already prohibited double 
jeopardy as a violation of the law of the land.97 Today the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina sometimes actually skips the middle term 
and simply asserts—most recently in 2014—that there is a double 
jeopardy clause in the state constitution.98 
 
Process Clause); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule 
of the Fourth Amendment to state criminal prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause). See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE 
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) 
(discussing the history of the Bill of Rights and its application to the states). 
 91. See, e.g., Parish v. E. Coast Cedar Co., 133 N.C. 478, 483, 45 S.E. 768, 770 (1903) 
(“We refer to the federal Constitution only by way of analogy, as we base our decision in 
the case at bar exclusively upon the provisions of the Constitution of this state.”). 
 92. Barnes v. Barnes, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 366, 374 (1861) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 11, at *141). 
 93. Staton v. Norfolk & C. R. Co., 111 N.C. 278, 282–85, 16 S.E. 181, 182–83 (1892); 
see also Yancey v. N.C. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n, 222 N.C. 106, 108, 22 
S.E.2d 256, 258 (1942) (citing MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215)). 
 94. State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 422, 426, 58 S.E. 998, 1000 (1907) (Walker, J., 
concurring). 
 95. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498–503 (1977) (advocating reliance on state constitutional 
protections). 
 96. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 97. State v. Battle, 279 N.C. 484, 486, 183 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1971). 
 98. E.g., State v. Banks, 367 N.C. 652, 655, 766 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2014) (quoting State v. 
Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 452, 342 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1986)) (referring to the “Double 
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The open courts clause, like the law of the land clause, traces its 
pedigree to Magna Carta. While the phrase “open courts” is not to be 
found in the original charter, it accurately captures the sense of 
chapter forty (1215): “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny 
or delay, right or justice”; that is, the courts shall be open to do 
justice.99 As a practical matter, the open courts clause in the state 
constitution functioned as a guarantee of speedy trial at a time when 
the federal guarantee in the Sixth Amendment did not extend to the 
states.100 In this case, Walter Clark was still proud to trace the 
guarantee to the words of Magna Carta. While continuing to insist 
that “modern research has demonstrated that we do not owe trial by 
jury to Magna Charta, and that it originated years after,” he remained 
committed to the tie between the historic charter and speedy trial: 
“One of the pledges of Magna Carta was that ‘justice should not be 
delayed.’	”101 In a per curiam opinion that bears the marks of Clark’s 
style, the court held that 
[w]hile Magna Charta did not originate, or require, trial by jury, 
as at one time thought, it is very certain that it did guarantee 
that there should be a prompt administration of justice by 
providing (chapter 47) that the courts will neither sell justice, 
nor deny it, nor delay it, and a delay of justice is often a denial 
of justice.102 
Had Clark read McKechnie’s commentary on chapter forty as 
closely as he read the commentary on chapter thirty-nine, he might 
 
Jeopardy Clauses of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions”). But see 
State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175 n.1, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 n.1 (1995) (citing State v. 
Ballard, 280 N.C. 479, 482, 186 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1972)) (acknowledging that the state 
constitution does not in fact have a double jeopardy clause but noting that the same 
protection is implied in the law of the land clause). 
 99. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 
12, at 52–53; cf. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	18 (“All courts shall be open; every person for an 
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course 
of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.”); id. art. 
IV, §	9(2) (“The Superior Courts shall be open at all times for the transaction of all 
business except the trial of issues of fact requiring a jury.”). 
 100. E.g., Pettitt v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 186 N.C. 9, 16–17, 118 S.E. 840, 844–45 
(1923) (Clark, C.J.); Slocumb v. Phila. Const. Co., 142 N.C. 349, 352, 55 S.E. 196, 197 
(1906) (Clark, C.J); Johnston v. Whitehead, 109 N.C. 207, 209, 13 S.E. 731, 731 (1891) 
(Clark, J.). 
 101. Davis v. S. Ry. Co., 170 N.C. 582, 599, 600, 87 S.E. 745, 753, 754 (1916) (Clark, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 102. Rose v. City of Rocky Mount, 184 N.C. 609, 610, 113 S.E. 506, 507 (1922) (per 
curiam). Chapter forty-seven in “Magna Carta of King John” as cited and reprinted in 2 
N.C. REV. STAT. 486 (1837) is chapter forty in the conventional division of MAGNA 
CARTA (1215). 
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not have been so certain. “This chapter,” McKechnie wrote, “like the 
preceding one with which it is so closely connected, has had much 
read into it by commentators which would have astonished its original 
framers. The application of modern standards to ancient practice has 
resulted in a complete misapprehension.”103 McKechnie explained the 
chapter as chiefly concerned with the sale of justice and attributed 
the prominence usually given to it in legal treatises	.	.	.	to the 
fact that it has been broadly interpreted as a universal 
guarantee of impartial justice to high and low; and because 
when so interpreted it has become in the hands of patriots in 
many ages a powerful weapon in the cause of constitutional 
freedom.104 
McKechnie barely mentioned delay of justice, and then only in 
connection with payments to speed the legal process. 
The tendency of lawyers and judges to understand the medieval 
words of Magna Carta in a modern sense was demonstrated afresh in 
1976 when the state supreme court held that the open courts clause 
guarantees public access to courtroom proceedings.105 The guarantee 
of legal remedies for legal wrongs thus became a guarantee of public, 
as well as speedy, trials. Having once created the right to public trials, 
the court has, of course, had to qualify it with exceptions.106 
CONCLUSION 
Anachronistic readings are perhaps inevitable in a tradition that 
looks to the past for guidance in the present. Clark may well be right 
that Coke and Blackstone misled their readers about the real 
meaning of Magna Carta, but the drafters of the state constitution 
were convinced and incorporated that meaning into the text. As no 
less a personage than Henry Kissinger reminded us: “[W]hat ‘really’ 
happened is often less important than what is thought to have 
happened.”107 So firmly settled was state law by 1905 that Clark could 
 
 103. MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 459. 
 104. Id. at 463. 
 105. In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 306, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9–10 (1976). 
 106. See, e.g., Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 474–78, 515 
S.E.2d 675, 691–94 (1999) (excluding the public during presentation of evidence regarding 
medical peer review investigation); State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146, 167, 377 S.E.2d 54, 66–67 
(1989) (excluding spectators that would distract the jury); State v. Burney, 302 N.C. 529, 
533–38, 276 S.E.2d 693, 695–98 (1981) (excluding the public during testimony of a child 
rape victim). 
 107. Niall Ferguson, The Meaning of Kissinger: A Realist Reconsidered, 94 FOREIGN 
AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 134, 137 (quoting HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: 
METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 1812–22, at 33 (1957)). 
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adopt the latest historical thinking without jeopardizing North 
Carolinians’ right to trial by jury. McKechnie was writing history, not 
law, but he did recognize that revisionist scholarship like his may 
“undervalue[] the importance of traditional interpretations which, 
even when based on insecure historical foundations, are shown in the 
sequel to have proved of supreme value in the battle of freedom.”108 
The Great Charter was one of the inspirations for written 
constitutions, intended to restrain the exercise of power. The great 
irony is that it empowered judges to use the text as precedent for 
judicial elaboration. The words—as so often in the common law—
were not the end of the process, but only the beginning. A text may 
mean, or imply, or be made to mean more than it says.109 Once the 
process has begun, the tendency is not to start with the words but with 
the last, or the last few, cases that construed them. One is almost 
tempted to say that it is not text, but texture that matters most.110 Just 
as Sir Edward Coke found new meanings in old documents, so 
modern jurists continue the search. One need only consider the recent 
same-sex marriage decision to see how far determined jurists can take 
due process or the law of the land or legem terrae.111 
Revisionism has a way of turning upon itself. Robert Brady had 
an agenda, the opposite of Coke’s.112 And even critics acting only in 
the interest of truth cannot attain certainty. As Professor J. C. Holt 
reminded us in his magisterial study of the Great Charter, Coke’s 
history is “not quite so insecure as	.	.	.	the modern critics would 
suggest.”113 It is, he said, “to pursue a will-o’-the-wisp” to assume that 
“the exact contemporary sense of Magna Carta can be established as 
a canon whereby Coke and all other ‘false’ interpreters can be 
 
 108. MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at ix (commenting on Jenks, supra note 56). 
 109. An example from federal constitutional law is the judicial elaboration of the 
Eleventh Amendment. See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987). 
 110. Cf. VLADIMIR NABOKOV, Canto III, in PALE FIRE (1962) (“But all at once it 
dawned on me that this / Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme; / Just this: not text, 
but texture; not the dream / But topsy-turvical coincidence, / Not flimsy nonsense, but a 
web of sense.”). I am indebted to Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, State of 
North Carolina, for directing me to these lines.  
 111. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–2605 (2015). 
 112. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 8, at 22, 25 (stating that Brady “made a full-scale attack 
on the view of history which the common lawyers had developed	.	.	.	[but] Brady carried 
his historical revision too far	.	.	.	.”). 
 113. HOLT, supra note 8, at 36. 
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judged.”114 It is not only the future that year by year recedes before 
us; it is also the past. 
Magna Carta is an historical artifact, and it is not. Or rather, 
there are two historical artifacts: what it meant in 1215 and its 
evolving meaning over time. History is the story of both stasis and 
change. The divergence of the two stories must be recognized, but 
need not cause alarm. As any property lawyer can testify, there are 
few titles in our law that are wholly unclouded, and the root of many 
of them is doubtful—based, you might say, on “insecure historical 
foundations”—but long continued enjoyment under a claim of right 
(i.e., adverse possession) clears away most clouds. 
 
 
 114. Id.; see also CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 
AND ITS SUPREMACY: AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND 16 (1962) (positing that Magna Carta 
stood for “a subtraction from the royal power” and subsequently “formed the most 
valuable precedent for the later exercise of national rights”). 
